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This paper tests two different pathways through which moralizing political campaigns can use 
self-image concerns of voters to bias votes. Both in Europe and the U.S., moral arguments are 
becoming increasingly prevalent in the political discourse (Sandel 2006, Haidt 2012, Enke 2020). 
This development is challenging for economists. A substantial part of the moral claims used in 
political campaigns clash with the consequentialist reasoning that economists prefer, even 
without being deontological (i.e., duty- or rights-based) in nature. Moral claims in political 
discourse take the form of praise or condemnation, suggesting, for instance, that voters’ choices 
between conservative and progressive politics reveal whether they are good Christians.  
Moralizing campaigners do not always inform the public about the true moral consequences of 
their requests; and not all of these non-consequentialist moralizing campaigns argue in favor of 
generalizable duties or rights either. Instead, some of them simply appeal to the voters’ desire to 
feel good about themselves (Bénabou and Tirole 2011). If voters are liable to such appeals, then 
voting outcomes may frequently contradict consequentialist and even deontological thinking.2 
Indeed, the moral benefits of some such outcomes may be outweighed by their moral costs. In a 
large (N >1000) two-wave survey experiment conducted around an animal-welfare ballot in 
Switzerland, we test if and how one can use moralizing campaigns that circumvent both 
consequentialist and deontological arguments to bias voters’ information collection, information 
processing, and voting behavior.  
It is well-understood that most people, at least to some extent, like acting moral. In the voting 
context, this is of particular importance since with low pivotality, voters tend to express their 
moral beliefs more than their material interests (Feddersen et al. 2009). However, acting moral 
relates to the true moral values of the acts in a rather opaque way. While utilitarianism requires 
that good deeds have good consequences, at least to the best of the agent’s knowledge, people 
confronted with moral choices often deliberately neglect harmful consequences of their acts. At 
least in the laboratory, they tend to avoid information on whether their choices harm others, as 
documented by Dana et al. (2007) and Ehrich and Irwin (2005). Such information avoidance is 
hard to rationalize by assigning a specific type of morality to the subjects. For instance, though 
a deontological morality could explain following a moral rule even in a situation where its 
application generates harmful consequences, it is not clear why a deontologist would avoid 
knowing these consequences. 
In an attempt to explain such willful ignorance, Bénabou and Tirole (2011) provide a theory of 
moral acts as identity investments: subjects infer what their character is worth from their past 
acts. Hence, they choose their acts with an eye on their future self-image and want to believe that 
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these acts are morally good, or at least not morally bad.3 Thus, apart from true (consequentialist) 
other-regarding preferences or deontological principles, self-image concerns – i.e., people’s 
desires to feel good about themselves – are a potential explanation of seemingly moral choices. 
These concerns motivate a self-signaling game in which beliefs about one’s own character are 
purposefully manipulated. For instance, people may support a campaign for a quick nuclear 
phase-out or against the use of animals in medical science just in order to make themselves 
believe that they have a morally good character. This phenomenon has important implications 
for information selection and processing. An act chosen without knowledge of its harmful 
consequences on others may keep one’s self-image intact. However, that same act committed in 
full knowledge of its harmful social effects would impair the self-image of anyone who is not a 
radical deontologist actually following a general moral principle. Hence, a self-signaling 
motivation for moral choices directly leads into the “moral wiggle room” (Dana et al. 2007):  
subjects in the laboratory avoid costless information on whether a preferred act has pro- or anti-
social consequences; and they do so in order to be able to both commit this act and sustain their 
moral self-image. Hence, self-image concerns can explain the purposeful use of information-
avoidance strategies. 
It is largely an open question whether people are both able and willing to uphold such strategies 
outside the laboratory. Information is harder to avoid in everyday life than in the laboratory. 
Voters encounter political ads in movies and on their Facebook account and receive political 
messages from their family, friends, and neighbors, many of them about consequences of the 
policies in question. However, there is another possible informational strategy that people could 
use to manipulate their beliefs about the moral value of their acts, in particular their votes: They 
could downplay information that contradicts the supposed morality of their choices, and they 
could overweigh information supporting this supposed morality.4 Such information-processing 
strategies of self-manipulation are as consistent with the theory of Bénabou and Tirole (2011) as 
pure information avoidance is. Similar to confirmation bias (Rabin and Schrag 1999), biased 
moral beliefs resulting from biased information-processing strategies could survive all contrary 
campaigns that impose consequentialist fact-based information on voters. If people do indeed 
use biased information-processing to improve their moral self-image, campaigners will be 
heavily tempted to play the moral card to trigger these strategies in voters and win them over. 
Their opponents will be at a loss of what to do against this – other than engaging in the same 
strategy and thereby escalating political polarization (Garrett and Bankert 2020). 
In this paper, we investigate how self-image concerns affect information selection and processing 
– and, through these, intended and actual votes. We do so in the context of a popular vote on an 
animal-welfare policy in Switzerland. The so-called Horncow Initiative demanded writing the 
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dignity of horned animals into the constitution and to cross-subsidize farmers with horned cattle 
that refrain from dehorning. Both the campaigners for the initiative and their opponents used 
consequentialist moral arguments. This ballot provides the ideal setting for our experimental 
research since it embodies a strong moral dimension and has a negligible material impact on the 
voters. We conduct a pre-registered and IRB-approved randomized online experiment prior to 
the vote and elicit voting behavior afterwards.5 Our main treatments manipulate the moral self-
signaling value of voting for the policy required by the initiative. These manipulations are 
implemented without referring to moral principles or attempting to affect beliefs on the policy’s 
consequences for the animals concerned, i.e., without manipulating consequentialist or 
deontological beliefs about the true moral value of a Yes or No vote. Within an informational 
intervention designed to kindle self-image concerns, we provide subjects with the truthful, if 
simplified, message that good-hearted people tend to be good to animals, too. Thereby, we 
weakly increase the moral self-signaling value of voting for the policy. We enable subjects by 
this treatment to use a Yes vote as a means to self-signal both being good to animals and being 
good in general, which supposedly feels better than the more specific belief of being good to 
animals. Importantly, our intervention does not provide additional information on the policy’s 
effectiveness or conformity with moral duties or rights and is hence irrelevant for truly moral 
attitudes. In an opposite informational intervention that is designed to restrict the moral self-
signaling value of a Yes vote, we tell our subjects that being good to animals does not necessarily 
imply being good to humans. Both interventions are compared with the benchmark treatment in 
which no extra message is provided. We then study how our moral information interventions 
affect the willingness to read arguments pro and contra the policy, trust in these arguments, voting 
intentions, and reported voting behavior. 
Furthermore, we add a social dimension. Even pure self-signaling must be sustainable in the 
individual’s social setting. Communication with peers can either counteract the strategies used 
to protect one’s self-image or, on the contrary, complement them. In particular, communication 
with like-minded people has been documented to have an insulating effect, preventing opinion 
change (Hüning, Mechtenberg, and Wang 2020). This suggests that informational strategies 
sustaining moral ignorance – and hence a positive self-image – may be more successful when 
flanked by the opportunity to communicate with a like-minded person and less successful with 
an opposite-minded person. We hence provide such opportunities to our participants and test 
their effects on information selection.  
At the end of our second wave after the vote, we match our subjects into pairs of either like-
minded or opposite-minded voters who may chat about how they voted and why. In our first 
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experimental wave, prior to the vote, we manipulate whether subjects anticipate being thus 
matched. Hence, we manipulate the anticipated degree to which our experiment provides social 
insulation to the participant’s prior attitude toward the Horncow Initiative. We then test whether 
the anticipated degree of social insulation affects information selection. 
We find that increasing the moral self-signaling value of voting Yes through our informational 
intervention has indeed significant effects: First, it enhances the intensity of subjects’ agreement 
with arguments stating that the policy at stake would indeed benefit the animals concerned, while 
the intensity of their agreement with arguments disputing this remains unchanged. Surprisingly, 
however, our intervention does not affect the choice of which type of arguments to read. Hence, 
we find that in the field, acting moral is sustained by biased information processing. This 
evidence specifies one important new channel through which “motivated bias” as in the 
modelling paradigm of Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2006, 2011) is generated and sustained in  
real-world situations. Second, our intervention increases the number of subjects intending to vote 
Yes and, third, even the number of subjects who report having actually voted Yes after the ballot. 
Decreasing the moral self-signaling value of voting Yes has no effect. We also do not find that 
anticipating communication with another voter, like-minded or not, has any effect on reading or 
trusting arguments, or on intended or reported voting behavior. Hence, we do not find evidence 
for the importance of social insulation in moral voting contexts. Our findings support and specify 
the theory of Bénabou and Tirole (2011): people, through their choice of actions, signal to 
themselves a moral value of their character. In our experiment, this works through biased 
information processing rather than biased information selection. In sum, the motivation of 
gaining a positive moral self-image indeed seems to be an important determinant of acting moral 
through a vote. 
Our findings are relevant for a variety of issues. If, as we argue, people want to believe being 
moral rather than be moral, playing the morality card during political, social, or economic 
campaigns can both be helpful and dangerous. It can be helpful since it can mobilize voters, 
citizens, and consumers to support a good cause, like moral standards in production. It can be 
dangerous since it biases at least some of them, motivating them to believe more strongly in the 
beneficial consequences of a suggested measure, ignoring counterarguments. For instance, it is 
tempting to play the moral card in support of rent control (“be moral, help the poor”), subsidies 
for windmills or bans on plastic bags (“be moral, save the climate”), or unilateral disarmament 
(“be moral, keep peace”), without going into depths about the complex consequences of these 
requests.  Arguments to the effect that the suggested policies might not have the promised 
beneficial consequences will be less convincing when directed toward voters or consumers 





Contribution to the literature 
This paper contributes to three different and hitherto unconnected strands of literature. The first 
strand is the theoretical and experimental literature on willful or moral ignorance. As modelled 
by Grossman and van der Weele (2017) building upon Bodner and Prelec (2003) and Bénabou 
and Tirole (2006, 2011), subjects signaling morality toward their future selves have an incentive 
to avoid learning whether their actions harm others.6 They are driven into ignorance by their fear 
of losing their positive self-image. Out of this fear, they can either avoid information that would 
undermine their self-signaling strategies, or they can bias their information processing. 
Validating the former prediction, subjects in the economic laboratory tend to exhibit a positive 
willingness to pay for remaining ignorant about harmful consequences, as documented by Dana, 
Weber, and Kuang (2007), Ehrich and Irwin (2005), Grossman and van der Weele (2017), and 
Serra-Garcia and Szech (2019).7  
We complement this literature in three different ways. First, to the best of our knowledge we are 
the first to investigate self-signaling strategies in the voting context.8 In this context, self-
signaling is particularly cheap since pivotality and the individual cost of voting are both low. 
Second, and relatedly, we choose a new angle: we shift the focus away from ignorance about the 
darker spots on one’s character which dominates the existing literature. Instead, we focus on 
ignorance about the potential non-existence of bright spots. That is, our focus is not on ignorance 
about the harmful effects of one’s egoistic choices but on ignorance about the doubtfulness of 
the supposed beneficial effects of one’s – seemingly – moral choices, as in Niehaus (2020). The 
distinction between the two is important for the following reason: it is intuitive that egoistic 
people, with high costs of being moral but a desire to think well of themselves, shy away from 
information on potentially harmful consequences of their choices. By contrast, it is much harder, 
and more depressing, to believe that a substantial number of so-called altruists are in fact only 
engaging in self-signaling – with doubtful consequences on those targeted by their apparent 
morality. If this were true, it would cast a cloud over one of the main pillars of behavioral 
economics, social preferences. Since we are investigating a moral choice of low individual cost 
– voting on a morally relevant ballot – we only show that some people who act moral engage in 
cheap self-signaling, which is particularly easy to do in the voting context. Hence, we do not 
argue that moral choices that are associated with more substantial costs, such as, for instance, 
organ donations before death, can also be traced back to moral self-signaling. Nonetheless, the 
consequences of moral self-signaling can be substantial in the voting context, even if the 
signaling itself is cheap: If a seemingly moral cause that has in fact no beneficial consequences 
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can generate a crowd of supporters despite the costless availability of arguments against its moral 
value, then substantial rents can be re-distributed or even destroyed under the cloak of morality.9  
The third way in which we complement the literature on moral ignorance is that we choose a new 
method: we investigate moral self-signaling in an online survey experiment, not in the 
laboratory.10  While we hence lose some control, in particular in having to rely on self-reported 
rather than directly observed behavior, we arguably gain in external validity. In particular, our 
sample is heterogeneous with respect to age, education, income, and relatedness to the issue of 
the ballot – more so than a student sample could be. In addition, the measured behavior itself- 
how our subjects vote - takes place outside the experiment.  
Moreover, we contribute to the literature on expressive voting. This literature is based on the idea 
that voters have two types of preferences, one about the material outcomes of the votes and one 
about expressing their opinions or emotions (see, among others, Brennan and Lomasky, 1993; 
Brennan and Hamlin, 1998; Tyran 2004; Feddersen et al. 2009; and Shayo and Harel 2012). The 
concept of expressive voting overlaps with the idea of moral voting bias that supposedly becomes 
larger when the pivot probability declines – a phenomenon that has been shown to occur in the 
laboratory (Feddersen et al. 2009) and that comes as no surprise if one believes in moral-self 
signaling. However, though intuitive, to the best of our knowledge the connection between moral 
self-signaling and moral bias in voting has never been made explicitly, or even supported by 
evidence, in the literature. We intend our paper to be the first step toward revealing the 
interconnectedness of these two important concepts. 
The final strand of the literature related to our contribution are the numerous field intervention 
studies in political science and, recently, political economics, that use manipulations of real-
world electoral campaigns to investigate voting behavior (see, among others, Zaller, 1992; 
Gerber and Green, 2000; Gerber et al., 2001; and Kendall et al. 2015).11 Methodologically 
speaking, our study takes an intermediate place between this literature and the literature that 
reports laboratory experiments on determinants of moral choices. Our study is innovative with 
regard to both in that we investigate votes as moral self-signaling devices, and in that we study 
moral self-signaling in a real-world voting context. 
                                                            
9  This said, we reserve judgment on the true moral value of the Horncow Initiative. It is our informational interventions, not the Horncow 
Initiative, that we declare as void of morally relevant consequentialist content.  
10  For other studies outside the laboratory, see Andreoni (2017) for a field experiment in the context of charitable giving and Freddi (2017) for 
field evidence from a natural experiment. 





2. Procedures and predictions  
2.1 Experimental design  
On November 25, 2018, the Swiss voted on the proposal of a grass-root initiative colloquially 
called “Horncow Initiative”. This initiative demanded to pin down the dignity of horned animals 
in the Swiss constitution. In addition, they asked for subsidizing farmers who do not cauterize 
their animals’ horns. These subsidies, they requested, should be financed by cutting agricultural 
subsidies elsewhere and should hence be without effect on taxes or prices. We chose this ballot 
for its near-absence of substantial economic impact: The cost and consumption effects that the 
initiative’s proposal would have on most voters in case of success would be negligible, and their 
self-interest would not be touched.12  Hence, voters’ instrumental concerns would be mainly 
altruistic, i.e., directed toward the proposal’s true consequences on animal welfare. This provides 
an incentive to gain as objective, unbiased information about these consequences as possible. 
Moral self-signaling concerns, by contrast, make it attractive to remain ignorant about the 
proposal’s potential negative consequences, or the potential absence of positive consequences. 
Hence, instrumental moral concerns and moral self-signaling concerns would be conflicting, 
which provides the ideal setting for a study of votes as potential devices of moral self-signaling, 
allowing us to separate these from consequentialist concerns. Deontological concerns would not 
necessarily conflict with self-signaling concerns but would be orthogonal to a change in the self-
signaling value of a Yes vote. Hence, our treatments also allow us separating self-signaling from 
deontological voting. What we cannot do is separating deontological and consequentialist voting 
motives. 
We conducted a pre-registered and IRB-approved two-waves survey experiment timed before 
and after the ballot.13  In the second wave, we re-contacted only subjects that completed the first 
wave. The first wave was implemented in the two weeks prior to the final day of the ballot, and 
the second wave a few days after. We restricted our experiment to the German-speaking part of 
Switzerland. The Swiss standing LINK Institute panel was employed for recruitment, and written 
consent was obtained from all subjects as part of wave 1. Only truthful information was given to 
them. Subjects were informed as part of their consent that the survey in wave 1 might vary across 
participants. We screened out early voters who had voted already before the start date of wave 1 
and participants not eligible to vote. 
In the first wave, we conducted nine randomized versions of one survey. All versions elicited, 
among relevant demographics, (1) variables measuring information selection, (2) a variable 
measuring information processing, and (3) the intended vote. In addition, we elicited control 
variables such as the PriorAttitude toward the initiative’s proposal and prior informedness 
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(Informed). A full list of variables and their explanations is relegated to Table A.1 in the 
appendix. 
Information selection. We measure information selection as follows. A booklet that the Swiss 
government sent to all Swiss voters several weeks before our experiment started contained three 
arguments in favor and three arguments against the initiative’s proposal. We used these and one 
other argument widely circulating in the media to create a balanced information menu: Three 
arguments in favor of the proposal claimed that dignity and physical well-being of animals and 
justice among farmers would improve, should the initiative be approved in the ballot. Three 
arguments against the proposal addressed these same three goals and argued that none of them 
would be reached in case of the proposal’s success. (See Table 1 for the precise formulation of 
the six arguments.)14 Our subjects had to choose which arguments to read: all six, only the three 
in favor, only the three against, or none at all. At the point of choice, they did not know that we 
were offering them only arguments they already were highly likely to know from the official 
booklet or the media. Thereby, without biasing their information set, we could measure the 
willingness of those predisposed in favor of the initiative to avoid negative information on the 
proposal’s potential consequences, either by avoiding information in general or by reading only 
the supportive arguments. Similarly, we could measure the willingness of all voters to avoid 
reading arguments that contradict their prior attitude toward the initiative. 
Information processing. Even if acquired information was unbiased, it might be processed in a 
biased way by our subjects, as modeled in most of the work of Bénabou and Tirole (e.g., 2002, 
2006, 2011). In our survey, we therefore asked for each type of argument, supportive or 
unsupportive of the proposal, how much the subjects who read it agreed with it ranging from ‘not 
at all’ to ‘fully’. This allows us to compute a measure of change relating the PriorAttitude, i.e. 
the degree to which participants reported to be leaning in favor or against the initiative before 
being exposed to treatment and information, to the degree to which they agree with pro or contra 
arguments post treatment. To this end we normalize all variables and take the difference between 
ex-post and ex-ante variables normalizing the result to the interval [-1,1]. The resulting change 
measures are ΔAgreementPRO and ΔAgreementCON. Moral self-signalers have to believe in the 
moral value of a Yes vote. Hence, the more they want to self-signal, the more they have an 
incentive to process arguments in a biased way, assigning more weight to the supportive type.  
Intended and actual votes. Voting plans tend to function as commitment devices (Nickerson and 
Rogers 2010). We hence elicit the immediate effect of our treatment variations explained below 
on planned voting behavior by asking our subjects whether they intend to turn out and, if they 
do, how they intend to vote. In combination with the variable PriorAttitude, this allows us to 
measure changes in how subjects evaluate the proposal after being treated in the experiment. 
                                                            





After the ballot, we re-contacted all subjects who completed the first wave and elicited their 
actual vote by asking whether, and how, they voted. 
Table 1: Arguments of the endogenous information-acquisition mechanism.  
Arguments for the Horncow Initiative Arguments Against the Horncow Initiative 
Dehorning violates the dignity of animals and 
is tantamount to a mutilation. It must mean 
something if nature gave horns to cows. For 
instance, these horns help the cows sorting out 
their hierarchy within their herd. 
 
 
It is well possible that the Horncow Initiative does not 
improve the dignity of animals. The reason is that in 
order to get subsidized, farmers could resolve to fixate 
their animals (e.g., by tethering). Their motive: 
Wounds caused by horns lower profits but may be 
prevented not only by dehorning but also by resolute 
fixation of the cattle, i.e., by limiting their range of 
motion to the greatest extent. Hence, farmers who 
nowadays dehorn their animals could, in case of the 
initiative’s success, switch to permanent tethering of 
their cattle. 
Horns are organs well supplied with blood. 
Dehorning cows requires cauterizing the 
sockets of the horns to prevent them growing. 
This is a substantial medical intervention.  
Even though this intervention is legally 
required to be conducted under 
anaesthetization, many calves suffer from 
pain after cauterization, partly for long time. 
 
*It is well possible that the Horncow Initiative does 
not prevent cruelty to animals. Resolute limiting of 
their range of motion in the stable or wounds caused 
by horns of other cows could result from subsidizing 
farmers with horned cattle. Possibly cows suffer more 
from tethering (or, alternatively, wounds caused by 
skirmishes with other horned cows in the stable) than 
from the dehorning. 
Since horned animals need more space and 
care from their farmers, a compensation for 
farmers holding horned animals is justified. 
Hence, farmers holding horned animals 
should be subsidized. Since the initiative does 
not demand a legally banning dehorning 
animals, the farmers‘ freedom of choice is 
preserved. 
Subsidizing farmers with horned animals may put 
those farmers at a disadvantage who breed hornless 
cattle. Even nowadays there are such farmers in 
Switzerland. There is no scientific evidence that cattle 
that is born hornless is “less natural” or suffers more 
than horned cattle. Hence, one should not put farmers 
who breed hornless cattle at a disadvantage. 
Note: *This argument has been taken from the media. The Swiss booklet sent to all Swiss voters mentioned an argument almost 
identical to the second in the right column here. 
 
Treatments. Our treatments are depicted in Figure 1. First, we vary the self-signaling value of a 
Yes vote: HIGH and LOW treatments differ from NEUTRAL treatments in that in both former 
types, we give subjects true information that we expect will enhance (in HIGH) or lower (in 
LOW) the salient moral value of a Yes vote.  In HIGH, we cite evidence for the positive 
correlation between cruelty towards animals and cruelty towards humans and conclude that good-
hearted people tend to be good to animals. In LOW, we cite evidence indicating that the 
correlation between empathy with animals in need and empathy with humans in need is less than 
perfect. Note that neither information touches the question whether the success of the initiative 





scientific foundation of our interventions.) These informational interventions are implemented 
after we elicit prior attitudes and prior informedness but before subjects have to make their choice 
of arguments to read. In the NEUTRAL treatments, we refrain from any such informational 
intervention.  
Second, and orthogonal to this variation, the treatments BUBBLE, CONFRONT and NOA vary 
what and how much subjects were told about communication in the second wave: in BUBBLE 
(CONFRONT), we told them that they would chat with someone of similar (different) prior 
attitude toward the Horncow Initiative after the second survey. In NOA (for “no anticipation”), 
we only told them that they would be re-invited for a second survey. Hence, BUBBLE and 
CONFRONT but not NOA induce anticipation of a social situation in which subjects may discuss 
their votes.  While BUBBLE lets subjects expect social insulation of their prior opinion, 
CONFRONT promises confrontation with a different opinion.  
The second wave of our experiment included a short survey identical for all subjects and a 
partner-chat in which, depending on whether the subject was in BUBBLE or CONFRONT, they 
chatted with an (ex ante) like-minded or opposite-minded partner. (Participants in NOA were 
randomly assigned to either a like-minded or an opposite-minded partner.) We re-invited all 
2,112 subjects who completed the first survey and had 1,057 completing the second. Apart from 
eliciting self-reported actual votes, the second survey contained questions on whether 
consequences (GoodEffect) or intentions (GoodIntent) are more important when morally 
evaluating – and rewarding – a particular action.  
Two pathways. Before we state our predictions, we clarify one important distinction that 
separates two mutually exclusive pathways toward voting in order to self-signal morality in our 
experiment: the distinction between information selection and biased information processing. 
While we can measure information avoidance by whether subjects neglected arguments, we can 
measure biased information processing by the agreement with arguments in favor or against the 
initiative only for those who read both types of arguments. Hence, if we find sizeable information 
avoidance, we will not be able by design to find biased information processing, because biased 
information selection implies that the sample of those reading both types of arguments is biased. 
Treatment effects on agreement with arguments in favor or against the initiative could not be 
reliably attributed to biased information processing in this case.  
Apart from this technicality, there is another design feature that marks the two types of 
informational bias as openings into two separate pathways of behavior. To see this, consider first 
a subject supportive of the initiative who ponders which arguments to read: all, or only those in 
favor, or only those against, or none. Our treatment interventions are designed to influence her 
choice. However, since we composed the set of arguments based on the booklet sent to all Swiss 





the subject’s information set should not depend on which reading choice she would finally make. 
Therefore, by design subjects who exhibit biased information selection in our experiment should 
not be driven by that to morally biased voting behavior, be it planned or actual. Hence, biased 
information selection in our experiment should not lead to biased voting, compared to how our 
subjects would have voted without our treatment interventions.  
Figure 1: Treatments 
 
However, it is easy to see that the situation is different when considering biased information 
processing. Here, we were unable to preclude by design that the bias on the informational stage 
translates into biased voting. A subject reading both types of arguments but influenced by our 
treatment intervention HIGH (LOW) to put more (less) weight on those in favor of the initiative 
may well become more (less) likely to vote Yes. Hence, we get the two potential pathways A (for 





Pathway A: In treatment HIGH (LOW), subjects become weakly more (less) likely to skip 
arguments against the initiative, compared to NEUTRAL, respectively. But they remain 
unaffected in their planned and actual voting behavior. 
Pathway B: In treatment HIGH (LOW), subjects become weakly more (less) likely to overweigh 
arguments in favor of the initiative, relative to those against, than in NEUTRAL, respectively. 
Hence, relative to NEUTRAL, subjects in the former treatments become weakly more (less) 
likely to plan to vote Yes and to actually vote Yes.   
Both pathways, A and B, are rooted in the theoretical literature discussed above, in particular in 
the work of Bénabou and Tirole. While the experimental literature on information avoidance has 
already documented subjects using pathway A in the laboratory, pathway B still lacks empirical 
evidence.15  
Predictions 
Below, we state the predictions for both pathways. If pathway A is clearly refuted, we will get a 
large enough subsample of subjects who read all arguments, which allows us to test pathway B 
if that sample turns out to be unbiased. 
Pathway A.  We now state all hypotheses relating to pathway A. 
Hypothesis H1.A (Self-Image and Information Selection). 
(a)  HIGH increases direct avoidance of arguments against the Horncow Initiative, compared to 
NEUTRAL for those not initially opposing the Initiative. 
(b)  LOW decreases direct avoidance of arguments against the Horncow Initiative, compared to 
NEUTRAL for those not initially opposing the Initiative. 
Hypothesis H2.A (Social Dimension and Information Avoidance).   
(a) BUBBLE increases direct avoidance of arguments opposing the participant’s own prior 
attitude, compared to NOA. 
(b) CONFRONT decreases direct avoidance of arguments opposing the participant’s own prior 
attitude, compared to NOA. 
Pathway B.  We now state all hypotheses relating to pathway B. 
Hypothesis H1.B (Self-Image and Information Processing). 
(a) HIGH increases the agreement with arguments supportive of the Horncow Initiative, 
compared to NEUTRAL for those who have read both types of arguments. 
                                                            





(b) LOW decreases the agreement with arguments supportive of the Horncow Initiative, 
compared to NEUTRAL for those who have read both types of arguments. 
Conditional Hypothesis H2.B (Self-Image and Votes).  
(a) If H1.B (a) is true, then HIGH increases the likelihood of (i) intended and (ii) reported Yes 
votes.  
(b) If H1.B (b) is true, then LOW decreases the likelihood of (i) intended and (ii) reported Yes 
votes. 
We now proceed to testing these hypotheses. We correct for multiple-hypotheses testing using 
the Romano-Wolf correction. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
The first wave of the survey was completed by 2,112 participants in German-speaking parts of 
Switzerland recruited from the standing LINK Institute panel that is representative for the Swiss 
adult population. The second wave was completed by by 1,057 participants. Summary statistics 
of both waves can be found in Table 2. Attrition was not random. Among those completing wave 
1 but not wave 2 there were significantly more (p = 0.0000) women and subjects were less well 
informed, more emotional about and more inclined toward supporting the initiative, compared to 
subjects completing both waves. Despite the overrepresentation of women among those dropping 
out, the share of women in the final sample is still above the national average (54.0 percent in 
the sample vs. 50.4 percent in the population). The share of participants that supported (opposed) 
the initiative in the final sample are comparable to those that participated in the ballot (see Table 
A.2). With respect to farmers in general, farmers with horned animals, and age, there was no 
significant difference between the samples. Unless stated otherwise, we report results for the 
subsample that completed both waves of the survey. For all outcome variables elicited in wave 
1, we also report results for all participants completing wave 1 to check whether sample attrition 















Table 3: Information selection across treatments (percent of observations) 
Read  HIGH LOW NEUTRAL BUBBLE CONFRONT    NOA ALL        No. obs, 
Both 77.50 79.50 79.73 82.81 79.28 76.91 78.90 834 
None 16.67 14.29 13.60 12.50 13.94 16.36 14.85 157 
Only PRO 4.17 4.04 4.27 2.73 5.58 4.18 4.16 44 
Only 
CONTRA 
1.67 2.17 2.40 1.95 1.20 2.55 2.08 22 
Opposing  78.3 81.7 81.9 84.0 80.5 79.1 80.6 852 
No. obs. 360 322 375 256 251 550  1,057 
Note: ‘Opposing’ refers to the set of arguments that oppose the prior attitude towards the initiative expressed by the participant prior to exposure 
to treatments. The first four rows are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, i.e. add up to the full sample completing both waves of the survey. The 
fifth row overlaps with rows 1, 3 and 4. 
3.2 Pathway A: information selection  
Strategic avoidance of information would be most obvious if treatments induced one-sided 
information selection. Hypothesis 1.A implies that the share of those only reading the PRO 
arguments should be higher (lower) in HIGH (LOW) than in NEUTRAL. Hypothesis 2.A implies 
that the share of those reading both arguments should be lower (higher) in BUBBLE 
(CONFRONT). Table 3 indicates that neither is the case. Mann-Whitney tests confirm that the 
distributions are not significantly different across treatments (Table 4). Logit regressions in 
Tables A.3 and A.4 confirm this. Hence, there is no clear treatment effect on direct information 
avoidance, i.e., Hypotheses 1.A and 2.A are not confirmed. 
  
 Wave 1 Wave 2 
Variable Obs. Mean std. dev. Obs. mean std. dev. 
Female 2,108 .592 .492 1,054 .540 .499 
age (categories) 2,112 3.836 1.623 1,057 3.855 1.666 
Farmer 2,109 .0123 .110 1,056 .0123 .110 
FarmHorn 2,112 .00473 .0687 1,057 .00473 .0686 
Informed 2,098 .0686 1.830 1,056 .3570 1.627 
PriorAttitude 1,825 4.023 2.062 1,057 3.741 1.967 





Table 4: Information Avoidance Non-Parametric Tests 





AvoidanceCONTRA HIGH vs. NEUTRAL 0.309 735 
 HIGH vs. NEUTRAL & LOW 0.280 1,057 
 LOW  vs. NEUTRAL 0.876 697 
 LOW vs. NEUTRAL & HIGH 0.704 1,057 
      
ReadOpposingAttitute BUBBLE  vs. NOA 0.102 806 
 BUBBLE  vs. NOA & CONFRONT 0.116 1,057 
 CONFRONT  vs. NOA 0.652 801 
 CONFRONT  vs. NOA & BUBBLE 0.953 1,057 
Note: While the impact of BUBBLE is close to being significant at the 10%-level, the direction of the impact is the opposite of that conjectured 
in Hypothesis H2.A a). 
In sum, testing Hypotheses 1.A and 2.A does not provide any evidence for pathway A: we do not 
find that voters use more information avoidance to sustain a moral self-image when salience of 
morality increases (HIGH) or less information avoidance when salience of morality decreases 
(LOW). Neither do we find that they avoid more information in a harmonious social setting and 
less in a confrontational setting (BUBBLE / CONFRONT) than under social insulation (NOA). 
Hence, either moral self-signaling and the degree of social insulation are irrelevant motivations 
in our voting context, or some or all of these motivations work through pathway B rather than 
pathway A, i.e., via biased information processing rather than biased information selection. We 
hence turn to testing pathway B. 
3.3 Pathway B: information processing 
Because the four interventions HIGH/LOW and BUBBLE/ANT did not induce any response in 
terms of information selection, the samples of participants reading PRO or both PRO and 
CONTRA arguments are likely to be unbiased by treatments. Table 5 confirms this. Only 
BUBBLE comes close to having a significant impact on sample composition. Hence, should 
BUBBLE turn out to be a significant driver of biased information processing or voting, then we 
would need to treat that result with caution. 
Testing the hypotheses for pathway B (H1.B – H2.B) requires some care in choosing the 
identification strategy. PriorAttitude, the variable capturing a participant’s attitude towards the 
initiative before any of the treatment interventions took place, is highly correlated with both post-
treatment agreement with PRO arguments (Pearson's r = -0.6104, p = 0.0000) and with 





0.0000). This is not surprising, as exposure to the survey and treatment interventions are unlikely 
to fundamentally uncouple a participant’s preferences and voting behavior from her position at 
the beginning of the survey. While PriorAttitude has immense explanatory power for the 
outcome variables of interest in pathway B, it also is arguably correlated with the error term as it 
is highly likely that it is causally affected by unobserved variables that also causally affect the 
outcome variables of interest. The facts that both coefficients and significance levels of treatment 
dummies are highly sensitive to the inclusion of PriorAttitude as a control variable and that t-
values for PriorAttitude are an order of magnitude higher than those of other explanatory 
variables (see Table A.5 in the appendix) point into the same direction. 
Table 5: Test for sample selection (Logit) 
 (1) (2) 
 Read PRO & CON Read PRO 
HIGH -0.022 (0.468) -0.015 (0.576) 
LOW -0.009 (0.774) -0.006 (0.838) 
BUBBLE 0.061 (0.056) 0.048 (0.094) 
CONFRONT 0.019 (0.537) 0.038 (0.189) 
Informed 0.016 (0.064) 0.018 (0.030) 
PriorAttitude 0.006 (0.356) 0.014 (0.013) 
Farmer 0.115 (0.514) 0.083 (0.574) 
FarmerHorn -0.222 (0.336) -0.047 (0.826) 
Age categ. Yes  Yes  
N 1052 1052 
Notes: Table shows estimates from Logit regressions. Dependent variables: Dummies if PRO 
& CON or PRO arguments have been read, respectively. Marginal effects are presented. p-
values in parentheses unadjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. 
 
To address this problem while still using the highly relevant information contained in 
PriorAttitude, we apply a diff-in-diff approach where PriorAttitude serves as the reference point. 
Because both PriorAttitude and the outcome variables AgreementPRO, IntendedVote and 
ReportedVote are measured in different but intuitively compatible categorical scales we 
normalize each of them to the interval (-1,1) and (0,1), respectively, before taking differences. 
The latter are again normalized to the interval (-1,1). This has the added advantage that the 
distributions of the resulting variables ΔAgreementPRO, ΔIntendedVote and ΔReportedVote are 
now close to continuous and we therefore use OLS instead of (ordered) logit regressions which 





Romano-Wolf (Romano and Wolf 2005a,b, 2016 and Clarke et al. 2019) procedure based on 
10,000 replications to calculate p-values adjusted for twenty hypotheses (five outcome variables 
times four treatment variables) and eight hypotheses (outcome variables AvoidanceCONTRA, 
ΔIntendedVote, ΔReportedVote, ΔAgreementPRO for treatments HIGH and LOW). Hence, this 
procedure takes into account that we use two outcome variables, ΔIntendedVote and 
ΔReportedVote, to test for hypotheses H2.B(a) and H2.B(b). As the implementation in STATA 
does not allow us to specify outcome-variable specific estimation methods we use OLS for all. 
For brevity, we only report adjusted p-values in those instances where the unadjusted p-values 
point towards a significant effect. 
Table 6: Information Processing Non-Parametric Tests 





ΔAgreementPRO      
Read PRO & CON HIGH vs. NEUTRAL 0.010 573 
Read PRO & CON / Wave 1 HIGH vs. NEUTRAL 0.005 961 
Read PRO HIGH vs. NEUTRAL 0.026 604 
Read PRO & CON LOW vs. NEUTRAL 0.676 548 
Read PRO & CON / Wave 1 LOW vs. NEUTRAL 0.808 924 
Read PRO LOW vs. NEUTRAL 0.813 577 
      
ΔAgreementCON      
Read PRO & CON HIGH vs. NEUTRAL 0.242 572 
 
Non-parametric tests of the impact of treatments on the agreement with the arguments in favor 
of the initiative and on intended and reported voting are reported in Table 6. Irrespective of the 
sample, HIGH significantly increases the agreement with arguments in favor of the initiative 
relative to participants’ attitude before the intervention. This is in line with hypothesis H1.B(a). 
There are no significant effects on agreement with arguments opposing the initiative nor of the 
LOW treatment on any of the outcome variables. Hypotheses H1.B(b) is not confirmed. 
Table 7 uses regression analysis to confirm the above findings controlling for different sets of 
exogenous variables that were all elicited before treatment interventions and multiple hypothesis 
testing. Regressions (1) and (2) show for the sample of participants that read both PRO and 






Table 7: Biased information processing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ΔAgreementPRO ΔAgreementCON 
 Read PRO & CON PRO&CON/ 
Wave 1 
Read PRO Read PRO & CON 
HIGH 0.061 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.051 -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.001) (0.011) (0.016) (0.513) (0.483) 
Romano-Wolf (0.014) (0.037)  (0.031) (0.052)   
        
LOW -0.002 -0.005 0.004 0.001 -0.000 0.016 0.015 
 (0.914) (0.824) (0.810) (0.979) (0.994) (0.524) (0.543) 
        
BUBBLE  -0.006 -0.003  -0.004  -0.012 
  (0.777) (0.853)  (0.863)  (0.638) 
        
CONFRONT  -0.028 -0.025  -0.024  0.006 
  (0.219) (0.160)  (0.278)  (0.801) 
        
Informed  -0.012 -0.008  -0.008  -0.007 
  (0.064) (0.116)  (0.209)  (0.329) 
        
Farmer  0.061 0.025  0.064  -0.109 
  (0.534) (0.735)  (0.513)  (0.323) 
        
FarmHorn  0.253 0.041  0.225  0.026 
  (0.155) (0.729)  (0.164)  (0.910) 
        
Age categ. No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
        
_cons 0.119 0.187 0.150 0.120 0.166 0.007 0.054 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.688) (0.279) 
N 825 825 1390 869 868 823 823 
R² 0.013 0.046 0.024 0.009 0.038 0.002 0.016 
F 5.277 2.820 2.407 4.090 2.410 0.788 0.922 
aic 120.7 116.0 257.4 126.2 125.3 295.0 307.6 
bic 134.9 186.7 335.9 140.5 196.8 309.2 378.3 
Notes: OLS regressions. Dependent variables: ΔAgreementPRO and ΔAgreementCON capture the difference between reported 
convincingness of PRO/CONTRA arguments post treatment and reported prior attitude (before treatment). Both variables are 
normalized to values between [-1,1] with positive numbers indicating a shift in attitude toward the respective set of arguments. 
p-values in parentheses unadjusted for multiple hypothesis testing unless specified otherwise; Romano-Wolf p-values in (2) and 
(5) corrected for 20 hypotheses (outcome variables AvoidanceCONTRA, ReadOpposingAttitute, ΔIntendedVote, ΔReportedVote, 
ΔAgreementPRO) for treatments HIGH, LOW, BUBBLE and CONFRONT) and in (1) and (4) corrected for 8 hypotheses (outcome 
variables AvoidanceCONTRA, ΔIntendedVote, ΔReportedVote, ΔAgreementPRO) for treatments HIGH and LOW, each based on 
10,000 replications. 
To test for robustness and reduce the risk of issues with sample selection, we repeat the analysis 
with two further samples. The sample in regression (3) consists again of those having read the 
arguments of both sides but based on all participants that completed wave 1 of the survey rather 
than on those that completed both waves. This adds another 565 observations, namely those that 
did not complete wave 2. Regressions (4) and (5) cover all participants completing both waves 





the 44 participants that did not read the CONTRA arguments. The treatment effect of HIGH is 
robust to both variations in the sample and to the correction for multiple hypothesis testing. 
Agreement with arguments against the initiative, however, is not affected by any of the treatments 
(regressions (6) and (7) in Table 7). In sum, we do find robust evidence for the use of biased 
information processing when morality becomes more salient, as in HIGH. If moral self-signaling 
is behind this bias, then HIGH will affect intended and reported voting behavior, too, as we 
hypothesized for pathway B. We hence now turn to investigating intended and reported votes. 
3.4 Pathway B: voting behavior 
Intended voting relative to participants’ attitude towards the initiative before the intervention 
(ΔIntendedVote) exhibits the same pattern as the agreement with PRO arguments. The impact of 
HIGH on ΔReportedVote is only significant at the 10%-level. This gives some initial support of 
Hypothesis H2.B (a). 
Table 8: Information Processing Non-Parametric Tests 





ΔIntendedVote      
 HIGH vs. NEUTRAL 0.001 712 
Wave 1 HIGH vs. NEUTRAL 0.025 1206 
 LOW vs. NEUTRAL 0.670 674 
Wave 1 LOW vs. NEUTRAL 0.362 1144 
      
ΔReportedVote      
 HIGH vs. NEUTRAL 0.064 529 
 LOW vs. NEUTRAL 0.423 516 
 
Figure 2 splits the share of reported YES votes by treatment and three categories of PriorAttitude. 
In all categories the share of YES votes is higher in the HIGH treatment than in NEUTRAL but 
the difference is statistically significant (5%-level) only among those initially opposed to the 
initiative. The latter group contains more than half of all participants in the HIGH and NEUTRAL 
treatments that reported their vote in wave 2 of the survey. Note that the attitude categories in 
Figure 2 are based on measurements prior to exposure to treatments and that the HIGH treatment 
induced a bias in favor of the PRO arguments relative to participants’ prior attitude. Hence, the 
stronger impact on votes for those initially opposing the initiative is not surprising for two 
reasons. First, identifying a PRO-bias in a group that already reports agreement ex-ante is much 





additional YES votes induced by the treatment, they are much more likely to occur and found 
significant, the larger the number pre-treatment NO voters.16  
Figure 2: Share of reported YES votes by categories of prior attitude 
 
 
Table 9 presents additional results of OLS regressions on ΔIntendedVote and ΔReportedVoting. 
The sample of regressions (1) to (3) contains all participants that completed both waves of the 
survey whereas regression (4) also includes those that did not complete wave 2 of the survey 
which increases the sample size by 718 participants relative to (2). The sample in regressions (5) 
and (6) is smaller as it includes only those who have completed both waves of the survey and 
reported to have participated in the ballot. 
All specifications show a significant impact of HIGH on intended and reported voting. 
Significance is robust to multiple hypothesis testing. In sum, we clearly find evidence for moral 
self-signaling along pathway B: Exposure to the intervention that raised the salience of moral 
self-signaling by voting in favor of the initiative, while having no impact on information 
selection, did increase agreement with PRO arguments and intended and reported actual voting 
in favor of the Horncow Initiative. Overall, this provides strong support for the modelling 
paradigm developed by Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2006, 2011) and the entire literature building 
on them. As it seems, in the field the preferred strategy to keep up a positive moral self-image 
can also be not to entirely avoid information that would undermine moral self-signaling strategies 
but to assign higher weights to information that helps rationalizing such strategies.  
                                                            
16  For the sample presented in Figure 2, the difference in the share of NO votes between the NEUTRAL and the HIGH treatment is: 5.87 





Table 9: Impact on intended/reported voting (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔIntendedVote ΔInt.V./wave 1 ΔReportedVote 
HIGH 0.041 0.046 0.044 0.025 0.059 0.070 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.025) (0.046) (0.018) 
Romano-Wolf (0.012) (0.005)   (0.092) (0.043) 
       
LOW -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.018 0.030 
 (0.783) (0.889) (0.873) (0.786) (0.555) (0.322) 
       
BUBBLE  0.023 0.023 0.013  0.016 
  (0.107) (0.114) (0.242)  (0.603) 
Romano-Wolf  (0.366)    (0.843) 
       
CONFRONT  0.003 0.002 -0.014  0.026 
  (0.849) (0.869) (0.210)  (0.399) 
       
Informed  -0.009 -0.009 0.010  -0.013 
  (0.023) (0.030) (0.001)  (0.136) 
       
Farmer  0.065 0.066 0.037  0.146 
  (0.360) (0.358) (0.488)  (0.294) 
       
FarmHorn  0.104 0.105 0.059  0.257 
  (0.342) (0.339) (0.468)  (0.284) 
       
GoodIntent   0.006    
   (0.179)    
       
HIGHxGoodIntent   -0.005    
   (0.552)    
       
Age categ. No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
       
_cons -0.001 -0.064 -0.024 -0.053 -0.161 -0.240 
 (0.907) (0.210) (0.282) (0.468) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1021 1020 987 1738 772 771 
R² 0.012 0.032 0.034 0.017 0.005 0.033 
F 6.195 2.400 2.109 2.138 2.076 1.824 
Aic -525.4 -521.1 -493.3 -789.3 528.8 529.0 
Bic -510.6 -447.2 -410.1 -707.4 542.8 598.6 
Notes: Dependent variables: ΔIntendedVote and ΔReportedVote capture the difference between reported planned/actual vote and 
reported prior attitude (before treatment). Both variables are normalized to values between [-1,1] with positive numbers indicating 
a shift in attitude toward support of the horncow initiative. p-values in parentheses unadjusted for multiple hypothesis testing 
unless specified otherwise; Romano-Wolf p-values in (2) and (6) corrected for 20 hypotheses (outcome variables 
AvoidanceCONTRA, ReadOpposingAttitute, ΔIntendedVote, ΔReportedVote, ΔAgreementPRO) for treatments HIGH, LOW, 
BUBBLE and CONFRONT) and in (1) and (5) corrected for 8 hypotheses (outcome variables AvoidanceCONTRA, 
ΔIntendedVote, ΔReportedVote, ΔAgreementPRO) for treatments HIGH and LOW each based on 10,000 replications. 
In order to validate this interpretation, we test a potential alternative explanation for the effects 
of HIGH. This explanation hypothesizes that those exposed to the HIGH treatment regard the 





by voting in favor of the initiative.  The variables used to test this idea are GoodIntent measuring 
the degree to which participants agree with the claim that good intentions rather than good 
consequences of actions should be rewarded and its interaction with HIGH (HIGH x GoodIntent).  
We do not find evidence for the alternative explanation of our results (see (3) in Table 9). 
Without controlling for PriorAttitute or any other control variables the share of Yes votes in the 
HIGH treatment is 40.2 percent relative to 36.6 percent in the NEUTRAL treatment. If only 36.6 
percent of the 256 participants (i.e. 94 participants) exposed to the HIGH treatment that reported 
their voting decision had voted in favor of the initiative, then we would have seen nine fewer Yes 
votes. If we assume the same impact for all 719 participants exposed to the HIGH treatment, i.e. 
including those that did not complete wave 2 of the survey or did not report their vote, then the 
number of Yes votes has increased by 26 due to the experimental intervention. Using the 
coefficient from regression (6) in Table 9, i.e. 0.07 percent, the number of Yes votes increased 
by 18 in the sample reporting their vote and by 50 in the full sample exposed to the HIGH 
treatment. For comparison, in the ballot the number of No votes exceeded the number of Yes 
votes by 239,182 out of 2.6 million votes cast. 
4. Further results 
In this section we report a number of interesting correlations between variables elicited in the 
survey as detailed in the pre-registration. However, these relationships cannot be interpreted 
causally, and several variables were elicited after the treatment intervention (GoodIntent, 
GoodEffect, FreqMeat, Intensive, Vegetarian, Vegan, NoEggsMilk, Overconfident) and hence 
can correlate due to past exposure to these interventions. Table 10 shows that anticipated as well 
as reported votes in favor of the initiative decreases in the frequency of meat eating but not with 
other dietary habits related to animal products.  
In addition, we test whether the self-reported level of prior informedness on the initiative 
correlated to specific ethical attitudes toward consequentialism. These attitudes are expressed by, 
first, the degree to which participants report to agree with a claim stating that rewards should be 
given to those whose actions result in good consequences regardless of his or her intentions 
(GoodEffects), and, second, the degree to which they agree with a claim stating that rewards 
should be given to those with good intentions regardless of the consequences of these actions 
(GoodIntent). If looked at separately, we find a negative correlation. In a joint analysis 
(regression (3) in Table 11), only GoodIntent remains significant. Hence, participants that 
reported to care for intentions behind actions also report to be less well informed. This is 
consistent as knowing the consequences of one’s actions (and votes) is less relevant if one’s focus 






Table 10: Non-causal analysis: Voting  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IntendedVote Int.V./wave 1 ReportedVote 
FreqMeat -0.096 -0.147 -0.174 -0.189 -0.206 
 (0.018) (0.075) (0.001) (0.001) (0.038) 
Intensive  0.063 0.103  -0.003 
  (0.728) (0.413)  (0.991) 
Vegetarian  -0.436 -0.237  -0.188 
  (0.390) (0.500)  (0.782) 
Vegan  -0.361 -0.407  -1.166 
  (0.719) (0.580)  (0.489) 
NoEggsMilk  0.502 0.312  0.809 
  (0.285) (0.366)  (0.295) 
_cons    0.469 0.545 
    (0.107) (0.245) 
N 1021 1018 1949 772 770 
chi2 5.612 7.539 23.455 11.328 12.671 
Pseudo R² 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.012 
Aic 3272.2 3269.2 6246.4 1021.5 1024.3 
Bic 3296.9 3313.5 6296.6 1030.8 1052.2 
Notes: Ordered Logit regression. Dep. Var.: IntendedVote and ReportedVote, reported are coefficients, p-values in parentheses 
Table 11: Non-causal analysis: Prior information  
 (1) (2) (3) 
GoodEffects -0.070  -0.038 
 (0.048)  (0.303) 
    
GoodIntent  -0.095 -0.073 
  (0.005) (0.043) 
N 1015 1019 1001 
chi2 3.90 7.89 7.10 
Pseudo R² 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Aic 3760.5 3764.3 3703.9 
Bic 3795.0 3798.8 3743.2 
Notes: Ordered Logit regression. Dependent variable: Informed; coefficients 
reported, p-values in parentheses 
Furthermore, both variables measuring information selection that we used in the previous section 
are not significantly correlated with proxies of ethical schools of thought (Table 12). However, 





the initiative (Emotions) and how much their self-assessed prior informedness (Informed) with 
respect to the initiative differs from their performance in a quiz about the initiative and horned 
animals (Overconfident). The latter is a dummy that equals one if a participants is above the 
median with respect to self-reported informedness but below the median in terms of quiz 
performance. Emotional involvedness is associated with more and overconfidence with less 
information selection. 
Table 12: Non-causal analysis: Information selection  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 AvoidanceCONTRA ReadOpposingAttitute 
GoodEffects -0.088   -0.053 0.086   0.049 
 (0.106)   (0.348) (0.110)   (0.387) 
         
GoodIntent 0.048   0.029 -0.101   -0.088 
 (0.362)   (0.597) (0.052)   (0.107) 
         
Emotions  -0.150 -0.170 -0.168  0.149 0.147 0.171 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
         
Overconfident  1.070 0.895 1.155  -1.127 -0.989 -1.189 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
         
_cons -1.500 -1.809 -1.539 -1.883 1.467 1.809 1.610 1.866 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1002 1031 1964 979 1002 1031 1783 979 
chi2 2.84 50.40 80.65 55.66 4.95 55.11 79.34 60.70 
Pseudo R² 0.003 0.050 0.040 0.060 0.005 0.055 0.044 0.065 
Aic 955.8 955.6 1961.4 882.7 962.6 959.6 1747.6 883.7 
Bic 970.5 970.4 1978.2 907.1 977.3 974.4 1764.1 908.1 
Notes: Logit regression. Dependent variable: AvoidanceCONTRA (regressions (1) – (4)) and ReadOpposingAttitute (regressions 
(5) – (8)). Regressions (3) and (5) based on all participants that completed wave 1 of the survey, all other regressions based on 
sample completing both waves. p-values in parentheses. 
 
Information acquisition in wave 1 is consistent with participants suffering from confirmation 
bias. Those ex-ante supporting (opposing) the initiative are more likely to only read the 
arguments supporting (opposing) the initiative.17 
  
                                                            





5.  Concluding remarks 
In the context of a randomized controlled trial around a popular vote on animal welfare in 
Switzerland, we find evidence of moral self-image concerns as a motivation behind voting 
behavior. We do not find evidence for social-insulation effects. An increase in the moral self-
signaling value of voting in favor of the initiative did not affect information selection prior to 
voting but did instead bias information processing. Participants exposed to scientific evidence 
establishing a correlation between kindness towards animals and kindness towards fellow 
humans assigned significantly more importance to the arguments supporting the initiative than 
those not exposed to such evidence and were more likely to vote in favor of the initiative. This 
specifies a precise channel through which individuals, in particular voters, generate motivated 
biases as modelled in Bénabou and Tirole (2002, 2006, 2011) and the literature that builds on 
them. 
The arguments that our subjects could choose to read after our informational intervention were 
carefully chosen such as not to present real news (they were largely identical to information 
provided to all voters ahead of the vote via official channels). Hence, if information selection 
rather than information processing was the prevalent way to keep up one’s moral self-image, it 
is likely that our design would have had no or only a negligible effect on voting behavior. 
However, we could not preclude non-negligible effects for biased information processing. The 
biased weighting of the arguments by those exposed to the treatment that increased the salience 
of morality resulted in more anticipated and more reported actual votes in favor of the initiative. 
However, our experiment had no decisive effect on the outcome of the ballot: though the vote 
turned out quite close, the Horncow Initiative was refuted in the end.  
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Table A.0: Information provided in treatments HIGH and LOW 
The interventions HIGH and LOW had the following wording (translation from German): 
Treatment Text shown 
HIGH 
Did you know that according to a scientific study (Arluke and Madfis 2013, 
available on request) cruelty to animals and anti-social behaviour towards 
humans are correlated? The study reports that those being cruel to animals are 
more likely to conduct criminal acts against humans. 
Examples from the study: 
● Someone torturing animals is much more likely to be violent against 
humans than someone who is kind towards animals. 
● Someone torturing animals is much more likely to run amok than 
someone who is kind towards animals. 
● Someone torturing animals is much more likely to disrespect property 
rights than someone who is kind towards animals. 
According to psychological research a common cause of anti-social behavior is 
a lack of compassion (empathy).  
Another study (Erlanger und Tsytsarev 2012, available on request) shows that: 
Compassionate people are much more likely to treat animals kindly than non-
compassionate people. Compassionate people are much more opposed to cruelty 
to animals and animal testing than non-compassionate people. 
Being compassionate is a necessary condition for kind-hearted behavior.  
Overall this implies: 
Kind-hearted people who care about the wellbeing of others and the good rules 
of living together are also more caring towards animals! 
LOW 
Did you know that according to a scientific study (Levin, Arluke und Irvine 2017, 
available on request) care for animals and indifference towards humans can co-
exist? The study reports that those helping animals might well ignore the 
suffering of other humans. 
Examples from the study: 
● A call for donations to help a sickly dog motivated more people to donate 





● A dog that had been knocked out induced an emotional response in more 
people than an adult that had been knocked out.  
What is the reason for some people to be more indifferent towards other people 
than towards animals? According to the researchers, a possible reason is that such 
people believe humans but not animals to be responsible (“at fault”) for their own 
hardship.   
The following true event provides further evidence for the possibility that 
compassion towards animals and indifference towards humans can co-exist: 
In a western industrialized country many people actively protested that a police 
officer who shot a dog out of an unfounded feeling of threat gets punished. The 
same people did not care whether a police officer who shot a mentally ill woman 
out of an unfounded feeling of threat gets punished. 
Being compassionate is a necessary condition for kind-hearted behavior. 
Overall this implies: 
People that care about animals are not necessarily kind-hearted people that care 
about the wellbeing of others and the good rules of living together! 
 
 
Table A.1: Variable descriptions 




HIGH Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant in HIGH treatment 
LOW Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant in LOW treatment 
BUBBLE Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant in BUBBLE treatment 
CONFRONT Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant in CONFRONT treatment 
Female Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant reports to be female (rather than 
male or other). 
Age categ. Dummies for eight age categories. Lowest bracket: ‘18-24 years’, then in 
steps of ten years up to 84. Highest bracket: ‘above 84’. 
Farmer Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant reports to work as a farmer 
FarmHorn Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant reports to keep horned farm 
animals in particular horned cows or goats 
Informed Categorial variable centered around zero with seven categories. -3 indicated 
that the participant reports to be ‘not at all informed’ and 3 that the 
participant reports to be ‘very well informed’ about the Horncow Initiative 
and the upcoming ballot 





towards the Horncow Initiative. 1 represents ‘Certainly against’ and 7 
‘certainly in favor’. 
Emotions 
Categorial variable centered around zero with seven categories. -3 indicated 
that the participant reports that (s)he does ‘not at all’  and 3 that the 
participant reports to ‘very much’ respond emotionally to the Horncow 
Initiative. 
FreqMeat Categorial variable on an eight point scale capturing the self-reported 
estimate of the frequency of eating red or white meat or meat products such 
as sausages, ham and entrails. Categories: 1: never; 2: only as an exception; 
3: once a month; 4: several times a month; 5: once a week; 6: several times a 
week; 7: once a day; 8: several times a day. 
Intensive Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant reports to eat meat at least once 
a day. Constructed from FreqMeat. 
Vegetarian Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant reports never to eat meat. 
Constructed from FreqMeat. 
Vegan Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant reports to adhere to a vegan diet. 
NoEggsMilk Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant reports not to eat eggs and milk. 
GoodEffects Categorial variable on a seven point Likert scale measuring the attitude 
towards the statement that consequences are more important than intentions 
of someone’s actions. 1 represents ‘Certainly against’ and 7 ‘certainly in 
favor’. 
GoodIntent Categorial variable on a seven point Likert scale measuring the attitude 
towards the statement that intentions are more important than consequences 
of someone’s actions. 1 represents ‘Certainly against’ and 7 ‘certainly in 
favor’. 
HIGHxGoodIntent Interaction between variables HIGH and GoodIntent 
Overconfident Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant’s self-reported degree of 
informedness (based on variable Informed) is above the median response 
(=0) but at the same time the participant’s performance in the quiz is below 
the median performance (8 out of 10 questions correctly answered). 
Outcome variables  
AvoidanceCONTRA Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant chooses not to read the 
arguments opposing the Horncow Initiative. 
ReadOpposingAttitute Dummy variable that equals 1 if participant chooses to read the arguments 
opposing his/her own PriorAttitude towards the Horncow Initiative. 
ΔIntendedVote Continuous variable bound to interval [-1,1] capturing the normalized 
difference between the self-reported anticipated voting at the end of the first 
wave and PriorAttitude. The variable is computed as follows: 
ΔIntendedVote = [(AnticipatedVoting - 3)/2 - (PriorAttitude - 4)/3]/2 
such that negative numbers indicate that the likelihood to vote in favor of the 
initiative has decreased relative to the attitude expressed before the 
exposition to the PRO and/or CONTRA arguments. Where 
AnticipatedVoting is a categorical variable that measures the participant’s 
voting plan in the ballot: 1 ‘certainly vote against the initiative’; 2 ‘likely to 
vote against the initiative’; 3 ‘I have not yet formed an opinion on how to 






ΔReportedVote Continuous variable bound to interval [-1,1] capturing the normalized 
difference between the self-reported actual voting and PriorAttitude. The 
variable is computed as follows: 
ΔReportedVote = ReportedVoting - PriorAttitude/7 
such that negative numbers indicate that the likelihood to vote in favor of the 
initiative has decreased relative to the attitude expressed before the 
exposition to the PRO and/or CONTRA arguments. Where ReportedVoting 
is a dummy that equals 1 if the participant reports to have voted in favor of 
the initiative. 
ΔAgreementPRO Continuous variable bound to interval [-1,1] capturing the normalized 
difference between the self-reported agreement with arguments infavor of 
the initiative at the end of the first wave and PriorAttitude. The variable is 
computed as follows: 
ΔAgreementPRO = [(AgreementPRO - 3)/2 - (PriorAttitude - 4)/3]/2 
such that negative numbers indicate that the agreement with arguments in 
favor of the initiative has decreased relative to the attitude expressed before 
the exposition to the PRO and CONTRA arguments. Where AgreementPRO 
is a categorical variable capturing how much the participant the PRO 
arguments he/she has just read convince him/her: 1 ‘not at all convincing’; 2 
‘more unconvincing than convincing, 3 ‘neither convincing nor 
unconvincing’, 4 ‘more convincing than unconvincing’, 5 ‘fully 
convincing’. 
ΔAgreementCON Continuous variable bound to interval [-1,1] capturing the normalized 
difference between the self-reported agreement with arguments against of 
the initiative at the end of the first wave and PriorAttitude. The variable is 
computed as follows: 
ΔAgreementCON = [(AgreementCONTRA - 3)/2 - (PriorAttitude - 4)/3]/2 
such that negative numbers indicate that the agreement with arguments in 
favor of the initiative has decreased relative to the attitude expressed before 
the exposition to the PRO and CONTRA arguments. Where 
AgreementCONTRA is a categorical variable capturing how much the 
participant the CONTRA arguments he/she has just read convince him/her: 
1 ‘not at all convincing’; 2 ‘more unconvincing than convincing, 3 ‘neither 










Table A.2: Attitudes and Voting in Sample vs. Ballot 
   In favor Opposing Neutral N 
Participants completing wave 1         
PriorAttitude 40.4 42.8 16.8 1,825 
AnticipatedVoting 36.6 40.6 22.8 1,954 
Participants completing both waves         
PriorAttitude 45.3 37.2 17.5 1,057 
AnticipatedVoting 43.9 36.7 19.4 1,021 
ReportedVoting 38.5 61.5   772 
Ballot Result         
all of Switzerland 45.3 52.9   2.62 million 
German speaking cantons 43.8 53.5   1.93 million 
 







Table A.3: Avoidance of CONTRA arguments (Logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Logit OLS Logit OLS OLS/wave 1 
HIGH 0.048 0.049 0.050 0.051 0.034 
 (0.206) (0.199) (0.180) (0.189) (0.236) 
      
LOW 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.008 -0.024 
 (0.999) (0.999) (0.821) (0.843) (0.406) 
      
BUBBLE   -0.056 -0.049 0.029 
   (0.197) (0.226) (0.322) 
      
CONFRONT   0.024 0.026 0.027 
   (0.513) (0.499) (0.363) 
      
Informed   -0.027 -0.026 -0.002 
   (0.024) (0.029) (0.824) 
      
Farmer   -1.749 -0.152 -0.218 
   (0.989) (0.573) (0.266) 
      
FarmHorn   1.931 0.439 0.318 
   (0.988) (0.251) (0.252) 
      
PriorAttitude   0.007 0.008 0.005 
   (0.639) (0.639) (0.647) 
      
Age categ. No Yes No Yes Yes 
      
_cons  0.160  0.162 0.128 
  (0.000)  (0.109) (0.099) 
N 578 578 576 576 1084 
R²  0.004  0.033 0.015 
F  1.064  1.386 1.108 
Aic  529.3  526.7 1042.0 
Bic  542.4  592.0 1121.8 
Notes: Dependent variable: Dummy variable whether CONTRA arguments have been avoided (1 = 
avoided, 0 = read). For the logit regressions (1) and (3) marginal effects are presented. p-values in 
parentheses unadjusted for multiple hypothesis testing. Romano-Wolf p-values not reported as even 






Table A.4: Reading arguments opposing own attitude 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Logit OLS Logit OLS OLS/wave 1 
BUBBLE  0.051 0.049 0.049 0.047 0.003 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.111) (0.114) (0.896) 
Romano-Wolf    (0.366)  
      
CONFRONT 0.013 0.014 0.009 0.009 -0.013 
 (0.652) (0.645) (0.770) (0.775) (0.585) 
      
HIGH   -0.035 -0.035 -0.017 
   (0.230) (0.229) (0.467) 
      
LOW   -0.008 -0.008 0.002 
   (0.793) (0.786) (0.922) 
      
Informed   0.015 0.015 -0.000 
   (0.073) (0.076) (0.962) 
      
Farmer   0.090 0.080 0.154 
   (0.587) (0.569) (0.160) 
      
FarmHorn   -0.212 -0.248 -0.152 
   (0.328) (0.271) (0.367) 
      
PriorAttitude   0.006 0.006 0.012 
   (0.352) (0.333) (0.009) 
      
Age categ. No Yes No Yes Yes 
      
_cons  0.791  0.808 0.795 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1057 1057 1052 1055 1817 
R²  0.003  0.018 0.013 
F  1.339  1.304 1.544 
Aic  1041.4  1042.1 1892.2 
Bic  1056.3  1121.5 1980.2 
Notes: Dependent variable: Dummy variable whether arguments opposing ones’ own prior attitude 
have been read (1 = read, 0 = avoided). For the logit regressions (1) and (3) marginal effects are 
presented. p-values in parentheses unadjusted for multiple hypothesis testing unless specified 
otherwise; Romano-Wolf p-values in (4) corrected for 20 hypotheses (outcome variables 
ReadOpposingAttitute, AvoidanceCONTRA, ΔIntendedVote, ΔReportedVote, ΔAgreementPRO) for 






Table A.5: Using prior attitude as control 
 AgreementPRO IntendedVote ReportedVote 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HIGH -0.130 -0.183 0.057 0.155 0.035 0.064 
 (-1.54) (-2.75) (0.56) (2.83) (0.81) (2.20) 
       
LOW -0.058 -0.025 0.021 -0.014 0.022 0.017 
 (-0.68) (-0.37) (0.19) (-0.25) (0.51) (0.56) 
       
BUBBLE 0.170* 0.098 -0.047 0.071 -0.030 0.020 
 (2.01) (1.46) (-0.45) (1.25) (-0.69) (0.68) 
       
CONFRONT 0.139 0.111 -0.014 -0.001 0.006 0.017 
 (1.60) (1.62) (-0.14) (-0.02) (0.14) (0.56) 
       
PriorAttitude  -0.317  0.586  0.170 
  (-22.24)  (50.55)  (29.15) 
       
_cons 2.587 3.813 2.870 0.619 0.372 -0.271 
 (37.60) (49.26) (34.63) (9.86) (10.88) (-8.40) 
N 825 825 1021 1021 772 772 
R² 0.010 0.383 0.001 0.716 0.002 0.527 
Aic 2345.8 1958.0 3542.9 2260.8 1087.1 512.8 
Bic 2369.3 1986.3 3567.5 2290.4 1110.3 540.7 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses 
 
 
